Back to Results
First PageMeta Content
Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Rationalizability / Normal-form game / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Information set / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Self-confirming equilibrium


Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31

Open Document

File Size: 369,98 KB

Share Result on Facebook

City

London / /

Company

Wilson / /

Facility

University College / Economics Tel-Aviv University / Tel Aviv University / Northwestern University / Carlos III University / Harvard University / /

Organization

UCLA / School of Economics / Tel Aviv University / Harvard University / National Science Foundation / Economics Tel-Aviv University / University College / Northwestern University / UCLA Academic Senate / /

Person

Ben Porath / Faruk Gul / Eddie Dekel Drew Fudenberg David / /

Position

lead player / outcomes player / associate editor / player / /

SocialTag