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Game theory / Mathematics / Nash equilibrium / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Backward induction / Potential game / Normal-form game / Folk theorem
Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30
Game theory
Mathematics
Nash equilibrium
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Subgame
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Extensive-form game
Backward induction
Potential game
Normal-form game
Folk theorem

Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

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