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Date: 1996-10-29 11:10:50Fictitious play Game theory Extensive-form game Best response | Plenary talk: 1994 Society for Economic Dynamics and Control Meetings Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine June 10, 1994Add to Reading ListSource URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.eduDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 173,42 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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