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Fictitious play / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Best response
Date: 1996-10-29 11:10:50
Fictitious play
Game theory
Extensive-form game
Best response

Plenary talk: 1994 Society for Economic Dynamics and Control Meetings Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine June 10, 1994

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

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