Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players - k-game - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players Add to Reading List Document Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40 Open Document File Size: 2,72 MB Share Result on Facebook / Facility Hong Kong University / University of Tokyo / University of Texas Austin / / Organization UCLA / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / University of Tokyo / Hong Kong University / Department of Economics / University of Texas Austin / MIT / Harvard / Stanford / Yale / / Person Nash Equilibrium / Adam Szeidl / Drew Fudenberg / Douglas Bernheim / Mihai Minea / / Position given player / defining player / payoff Player / player / / URL http / SocialTag Nash equilibrium Subgame Strategy Information set Bayesian game Game theory Extensive-form game Solution concept

Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and playersAdd to Reading List