Quantal Response and Gambler’s Fallacy Explain Suboptimal Behavior in Bargaining Experiments? Salvatore Nunnari University of California, San Diego [removed] Jan Z´apal

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Date: 2013-11-12 04:24:57 Business Quantal response equilibrium Bargaining problem Ultimatum game Bargaining Nash equilibrium Fallacy Cooperative game Economic model Game theory Problem solving Decision theory		Quantal Response and Gambler’s Fallacy Explain Suboptimal Behavior in Bargaining Experiments? Salvatore Nunnari University of California, San Diego [removed] Jan Z´apal Add to Reading List Source URL: www.barcelonagse.eu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 535,58 KB Share Document on Facebook

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