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Business / Quantal response equilibrium / Bargaining problem / Ultimatum game / Bargaining / Nash equilibrium / Fallacy / Cooperative game / Economic model / Game theory / Problem solving / Decision theory


Quantal Response and Gambler’s Fallacy Explain Suboptimal Behavior in Bargaining Experiments? Salvatore Nunnari University of California, San Diego [removed] Jan Z´apal
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Document Date: 2013-11-12 04:24:57

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City

Prague / Barcelona / Rapoport / CERGE-EI / /

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Facility

California Institute of Technology / Salvatore Nunnari University of California / /

IndustryTerm

legislative bargaining protocol / expected utilities / parliamentary systems / institutional protocol / /

Organization

California Institute of Technology / Universitat de Barcelona / University of California / San Diego / /

Person

Guillaume Frech´ette / Thomas R. Palfrey / Kalai / Colin Camerer / Maria Montero / Marina Agranov / Jean-Laurent Rosenthal / Matthew Rabin / /

Position

randomly selected legislator / original model / a group / Walker / proposing player / remaining legislator / legislator / party leader / same legislator / head of state / utility player / player / /

ProvinceOrState

Sefton / California / /

Technology

institutional protocol / same bargaining protocol / specific legislative bargaining protocol / /

SocialTag