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 Date: 2009-05-11 03:45:07Economics Economy Auction theory Competition Competitive equilibrium Market Microeconomics Fellows of the Econometric Society Game theory ArrowDebreu model Herbert Scarf Edgeworth conjecture |
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Markets with a Continuum of Traders Author(s): Robert J. Aumann Source: Econometrica, Vol. 32, NoJan. - Apr., 1964), ppPublished by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable 
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
