Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s Productivity HOSAENA H. GHEBRU International Food Policy Researc Institute (IFPRI), 2033 K. Street, Washington,

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Date: 2012-07-09 12:16:14 Property Landlord–tenant law Renting Property law Sharecropping Leasehold estate Land reform Lease Eviction Real property law Law Real estate		Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s Productivity HOSAENA H. GHEBRU International Food Policy Researc Institute (IFPRI), 2033 K. Street, Washington, Add to Reading List Source URL: ageconsearch.umn.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 330,02 KB Share Document on Facebook

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