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Property / Landlord–tenant law / Renting / Property law / Sharecropping / Leasehold estate / Land reform / Lease / Eviction / Real property law / Law / Real estate


Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s Productivity HOSAENA H. GHEBRU International Food Policy Researc Institute (IFPRI), 2033 K. Street, Washington,
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Document Date: 2012-07-09 12:16:14

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File Size: 330,02 KB

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Washington / DC / Iguaçu / Aas / /

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Norway / Thailand / Nepal / Pakistan / United States / Brazil / Tunisia / Philippines / Ghana / Ethiopia / India / Eritrea / /

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Resource Management (IØR) / Norwegian University of Life Sciences / International Food Policy Researc Institute / Productivity HOSAENA H. GHEBRU International Food Policy Researc Institute / /

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search costs / in-law tenants / insurance policy / high search cost / /

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Government of Ethiopia / Department of Economics and Resource Management / International Association of Agricultural Economists / Norwegian University of Life Sciences / Sharecropper’s Productivity HOSAENA H. GHEBRU International Food Policy Researc Institute / European Union / Ministry of Agriculture / Rural Development / AND STEIN T. HOLDEN Department of Economics and Resource Management / International Food Policy Researc Institute / /

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