Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 6 (November, 2003), 1619–1660 LONG CHEAP TALK1 BY ROBERT J. AUMANN AND SERGIU HART With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message—even when one side i

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Date: 2006-05-09 13:26:06 Cheap talk Outcome Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Repeated game Battle of the sexes Solution concept Normal-form game Game theory Problem solving Economics		Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 6 (November, 2003), 1619–1660 LONG CHEAP TALK1 BY ROBERT J. AUMANN AND SERGIU HART With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message—even when one side i Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ppge.ufrgs.br Download Document from Source Website File Size: 504,70 KB Share Document on Facebook

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