Central Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment: Experimental Evidence∗ John Duffy a and Frank Heinemann b This Draft: 12 September 2017 Abstract: We implement a repeated version of t

Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Directed Search and the Futility of Cheap Talk Kenneth Mirkin and Marek Pycia JunePreliminary Draft. Abstract We study directed search in a frictional two-sided matching market in which each seller can communicate

Source URL: pycia.bol.ucla.edu

Money, Glory and Cheap Talk: Analyzing Strategic Behavior of Contestants in Simultaneous Crowdsourcing Contests on TopCoder.com Nikolay Archak New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business 44 West 4th Street,

Source URL: pages.stern.nyu.edu

Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk Christian Kellner and Mark Thordal-Le Quement Abstract This paper provides a rationale for ambiguous language, understood as language generated according to an incompletely known commun

Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Modes of ambiguous communication Christian Kellner and Mark Thordal-Le Quement University of Bonn Abstract We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring an ambiguous state distribut

Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗ May 2016

Source URL: thred.devecon.org

• Game theory
• Mathematics
• Asymmetric information
• Bayesian game
• Code
• Cheap talk
• Economic equilibrium
• Strategy
• Coordination game
• Logic
• Philosophy of mathematics

Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

• Game theory
• Decision theory
• Gaming
• Leisure
• Nash equilibrium
• Cheap talk
• Subgame perfect equilibrium
• Strategy
• Subgame
• Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
• Best response
• Coordination game

Microsoft Word - Pinocchio30_footnote_in_text.doc

Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

• Asymmetric information
• Signaling game
• Behavior
• Deception
• Cheap talk
• Experimental economics
• Knowledge
• Economics

Scalable Rational Secret Sharing [Extended Abstract] Varsha Dani Mahnush Movahedi

Source URL: www.dcg.ethz.ch

• Cryptography
• Verifiable secret sharing
• Secret sharing
• Secure multi-party computation
• Net
• Cheap talk
• Constructible universe
• Expected value
• Quantum Byzantine agreement
• Stable distribution

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4

Source URL: octavia.zoology.washington.edu

• Game theory
• Signaling game
• Cheap talk
• Signalling
• Nash equilibrium
• Handicap principle
• Strategy
• Best response
• Economic equilibrium