1![Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/7c4c9a2bb8ceedae84553a8882dfeba4.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: userwww.sfsu.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48
|
---|
2![OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/601cb434df10dce5de364b8722eb0529.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:24:21
|
---|
3![A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗ May 2016 A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗ May 2016](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/f0dc00c5db4b46f4526e6ded588b2afc.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: thred.devecon.orgLanguage: English - Date: 2016-05-27 10:38:33
|
---|
4![Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/2c4f75ee7c585dfb8906234778d94294.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: cess.nyu.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2010-06-08 08:08:24
|
---|
5![Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida** Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/e3df3ee03e77459f87f928540a0d3c01.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.sfbtr15.deLanguage: English - Date: 2015-09-17 09:28:36
|
---|
6![Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail: Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail: Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/a5c05a7b0cd566b06719298041a74c7d.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: faculty.biu.ac.ilLanguage: English - Date: 2012-06-24 02:01:47
|
---|
7![Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001. Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/2e99c8826fbdd668fd5b0dc0b18e8235.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2011-04-12 09:46:06
|
---|
8![Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning Terri Kneeland∗ November 4th, 2015 Abstract This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning Terri Kneeland∗ November 4th, 2015 Abstract This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/7e1d8fcaaf3420e8448b28aedf83746f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: terri.microeconomics.caLanguage: English - Date: 2015-11-10 07:36:30
|
---|
9![Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599 THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599 THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/8c3d6e1e36bce3be501230cc352d82da.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:57
|
---|
10![Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen, Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/fafec0af0b2743740b750ba80b7e797a.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:47
|
---|