Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: the Two-Player Case∗ P´eter Vida†and Fran¸coise Forges‡ January[removed]first version: February 2011) - Cheap - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

First Page	Meta Content
	Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: the Two-Player Case∗ P´eter Vida†and Fran¸coise Forges‡ January[removed]first version: February 2011) Add to Reading List Document Date: 2012-03-12 10:03:08 Open Document File Size: 405,48 KB Share Result on Facebook City Paris / Barcelona / / Company Theoretical Economics / / / Event Person Communication and Meetings / / Facility University of Vienna / / IndustryTerm well-behaved correlation devices / communication device / correlation device / physical hard devices / cryptographic tool / / Organization Universitat Aut` / Department of Economics / University of Vienna / / Person Adam Szeidl / Rabin / Olivier Gossner / Ai / Ben Porath / Manfred Nermuth / / Position mediator / players can preserve their privacy / player / single informed player / mediator / co-editor / / ProvinceOrState Maine / / Technology Cryptography / / SocialTag Bayesian game Cheap talk Nash equilibrium Solution concept Correlated equilibrium Mechanism design Revelation principle Strategy Outcome Game theory

Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: the Two-Player Case∗ P´eter Vida†and Fran¸coise Forges‡ January[removed]first version: February 2011)Add to Reading List