Common value auction

Results: 57



#Item
1Winner’s Curse in 3G Spectrum Auctions: What is expected in India? By Kumar Rishabh Global Research Services Traditionally, 3G licenses have been distributed either using ‘Beauty Contests’ or Auctions. Through beau

Winner’s Curse in 3G Spectrum Auctions: What is expected in India? By Kumar Rishabh Global Research Services Traditionally, 3G licenses have been distributed either using ‘Beauty Contests’ or Auctions. Through beau

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Source URL: www.pensions-research.org

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-09 09:40:08
2On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm

On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm

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Source URL: www.carloalberto.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-11-14 08:52:32
    3Randomization, Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments: The Role of Cash Balances in Private Value Auctions John C. Ham Ohio State University

    Randomization, Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments: The Role of Cash Balances in Private Value Auctions John C. Ham Ohio State University

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    Source URL: econweb.umd.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2009-07-25 17:12:32
    4Microsoft Word - cd1900.doc

    Microsoft Word - cd1900.doc

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    Source URL: www.wambach.uni-koeln.de

    Language: English - Date: 2013-07-22 08:38:32
    5When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? Patrick Hummel R. Preston McAfee Google Inc.

    When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? Patrick Hummel R. Preston McAfee Google Inc.

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    Source URL: www.www2015.it

    Language: English - Date: 2015-05-15 11:19:15
    6On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm Han Hong Department of Economics, Stanford University Harry J. Paar

    On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm Han Hong Department of Economics, Stanford University Harry J. Paar

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    Source URL: web.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2012-10-16 21:06:37
    7Foundations of Information Aggregation Mechanisms Preliminary and Incomplete: a Revision will be Sent Later Eiichiro Kazumori April 7, 2004 Abstract

    Foundations of Information Aggregation Mechanisms Preliminary and Incomplete: a Revision will be Sent Later Eiichiro Kazumori April 7, 2004 Abstract

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    Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2004-05-25 12:47:48
    8Microsoft Word - CHK_revision_finalAER.doc

    Microsoft Word - CHK_revision_finalAER.doc

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    Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29
    9John H. Kagel · Svetlana Pevnitskaya · Lixin Ye Survival Auctions Received: Accepted:

    John H. Kagel · Svetlana Pevnitskaya · Lixin Ye Survival Auctions Received: Accepted:

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    Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:10:16
    10Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders John H. Kagel; Dan Levin The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, NoJul., 1993), pp

    Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders John H. Kagel; Dan Levin The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, NoJul., 1993), pp

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    Source URL: www.cs.princeton.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2008-01-28 02:07:07