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Structure / Nash equilibrium / Replicator equation / Dynamical system / Evolutionary game theory / Agent-based model / Strategy / Coordination game / Evolutionarily stable strategy / Game theory / Science / Problem solving


FAQ-learning in Matrix Games: Demonstrating Convergence near Nash Equilibria, and Bifurcation of Attractors in the Battle of Sexes Michael Kaisers, Karl Tuyls Maastricht University P.O. BoxMD Maastricht, The Ne
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Document Date: 2012-04-29 08:04:49


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Richland / New York / /

Company

Cambridge University Press / Mathematical Biosciences / MIT Press / Dynamical Systems / Multiagent Systems / Multi-Agent Systems / /

Country

United States / /

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mobile phone networks / reinforcement learning algorithms / policy gradient learning algorithm / ubiquitous applications / learning algorithms / /

Organization

Cambridge University / MIT / Artificial Copyright Intelligence / Association for the Advancement / International Foundation for Autonomous Agents / /

Person

Gomes / Morgan Kaufman / Nash Equilibria / Karl Tuyls / TAL N ETHERLANDS / Mansour / Morgan Kaufmann / /

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representative / General / row player / player / column player / /

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Pentax K-x Digital Camera / /

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Machine Learning / Journal of Economic Theory / /

Technology

cellular telephone / reinforcement learning algorithms / thermodynamics / artificial intelligence / Machine Learning / simulation / policy gradient learning algorithm / /

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www.aaai.org / /

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