<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Sustainable transport / Transport economics / Game theory / Transportation planning / Downs–Thomson paradox / Nash equilibrium / Traffic congestion / Coordination game / Highway / Transport / Land transport / Road transport
Date: 2009-05-09 03:13:51
Sustainable transport
Transport economics
Game theory
Transportation planning
Downs–Thomson paradox
Nash equilibrium
Traffic congestion
Coordination game
Highway
Transport
Land transport
Road transport

Add to Reading List

Source URL: blogperso.univ-rennes1.fr

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 315,94 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

DocID: 1roEf - View Document

OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4  EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

DocID: 1rgeF - View Document

A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗  May 2016

A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗ May 2016

DocID: 1reC3 - View Document

Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc

Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc

DocID: 1rcql - View Document

Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

DocID: 1r9KP - View Document