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![]() Date: 2009-05-09 03:13:51Sustainable transport Transport economics Game theory Transportation planning Downs–Thomson paradox Nash equilibrium Traffic congestion Coordination game Highway Transport Land transport Road transport | Source URL: blogperso.univ-rennes1.frDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 315,94 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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