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Game theory / Non-cooperative games / The Evolution of Cooperation / Repeated game / Risk dominance / Strategic dominance / Co-operation / Tit for tat / Cooperation / Coordination game / Best response / Centipede game
Date: 2010-06-08 08:08:24
Game theory
Non-cooperative games
The Evolution of Cooperation
Repeated game
Risk dominance
Strategic dominance
Co-operation
Tit for tat
Cooperation
Coordination game
Best response
Centipede game

Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc

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