Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.

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Date: 2011-04-12 09:46:06 Game theory Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Risk dominance Best response Strategy Solution concept Coordination game Bayesian game Folk theorem		Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001. Add to Reading List Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 451,22 KB Share Document on Facebook

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