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| First Page | Document Content | |
|---|---|---|
 Date: 2004-02-24 15:32:28Game theory Nash equilibrium Strategy Quantal response equilibrium Poisson distribution Solution concept Strategic dominance Coordination game Best response Subgame perfect equilibrium Risk dominance |
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