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Game theory / Network flow / Auctioneering / Networks / NP-complete problems / Vertex cover / Maximum flow problem / Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction / Strategyproof / Graph theory / Mathematics / Theoretical computer science


Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents Yoram Bachrach and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein {yori, jeff}@cs.huji.ac.il School of Engineering a
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Document Date: 2005-07-11 16:49:14


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File Size: 71,81 KB

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Facility

Computer Science Hebrew University / /

IndustryTerm

flow network / allocation systems / layered graph flow network / maximal flow algorithm / system-wide solution / /

Organization

Engineering and Computer Science Hebrew University Jerusalem / Econometric Society / School of Engineering / World Congress / /

Person

Jean-Jacques Laffont / Leonid Hurwicz / Jerry Green / Yoram Bachrach / Jeffrey S. Rosenschein / /

Technology

artificial intelligence / maximal flow algorithm / Edmonds-Karp algorithm / /

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