Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell

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Date: 2014-08-15 00:43:42 Mechanism design Social choice theory Theory of the firm Market Value added tax Economic theories Economics Game theory		Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell Add to Reading List Source URL: www.tomwilkening.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,54 MB Share Document on Facebook

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