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Mechanism design / Social choice theory / Theory of the firm / Market / Value added tax / Economic theories / Economics / Game theory


Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell
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Document Date: 2014-08-15 00:43:42

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File Size: 1,54 MB

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City

Evanston / Zurich / Katok / Essen / Building / /

Company

Kellogg / Blount / /

Country

Australia / /

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Facility

National University of Singapore / University of Melbourne / Commerce Building / Northwestern University / University of Technology / Zurich University / /

IndustryTerm

by-product / technology adoption / insurance property / /

Organization

University of Melbourne / School of Management / Department of Economics / Faculty of Business and Economics / National University of Singapore / Zurich University / Northwestern University / Department of Management / University of Technology / Sydney / /

Person

Tom Wilkening / Greg Fischer / Jean Tirole / Robert Gibbons / Christian Zehnder / Martin Dufwenberg / Ernst Fehr Michael Powell Tom / Lorenz Goette / Mathias Dewatripont / Hans Zhu / Ernst Fehr / Michael Powell Tom Wilkening∗ August / James Bland / Eric Maskin / Michael Powell / /

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Position

driver / arbitrator / arbitrator / and play proceeds / /

ProvinceOrState

Sefton / Illinois / Victoria / /

Technology

ESA / /

SocialTag