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Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48Game theory Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Strategy Best response Extensive-form game Zero-sum game Matching pennies Coordination game Battle of the sexes | Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions anAdd to Reading ListSource URL: userwww.sfsu.eduDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 220,65 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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