Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

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Date: 2003-05-01 11:34:36 Game theory Manipulated Nash equilibrium Subgame Nash equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Information set Strategy Solution concept Extensive-form game Sequential game Coordination game Centipede game		Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213 Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 478,80 KB Share Document on Facebook

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