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Non-credible threat
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1	Microsoft Word - Cressman (2003) Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ssc.wisc.edu Language: English - Date: 2004-10-15 12:36:33 Game theory Decision theory Mathematics Subgame Solution concept Nash equilibrium Non-credible threat Signaling game Centipede game Information set Evolutionary game theory Replicator
2	The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis May 2, 2008 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: www.umass.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-05-01 20:54:48 Sequential equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Solution concept Bayesian game Subgame Centipede game Non-credible threat Extensive-form game Best response Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
3	The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis February 6, 2009 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: www.umass.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-02-06 10:39:21 Nash equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Bayesian game Subgame Centipede game Non-credible threat Best response Strategy Game theory Problem solving Solution concept
4	2009_02_23 generalized backward induction.dvi Add to Reading List Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-11-04 13:01:48 Mathematics Subgame Solution concept Extensive-form game Non-credible threat Centipede game Backward induction Nash equilibrium Information set Game theory Problem solving Mathematical logic
5	Readers with comments should address them to: Add to Reading List Source URL: www.law.uchicago.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-11-29 14:18:46 Contract Non-credible threat Cover Price Contract law Law Business
6	Multi-Robot Negotiation: Approximating the Set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in General-Sum Stochastic Games Chris Murray Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.cmu.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-01-16 16:09:06 Subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Subgame Solution concept Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Non-credible threat Strategy Outcome Strategic dominance Game theory Problem solving Decision theory
7	19 Sept[removed]Eric Rasmusen, [removed]. Http://www.rasmusen.org. Overheads for Chapter 4 of Games and Information 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.rasmusen.org Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:52 Subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Subgame Strategy Best response Solution concept Non-credible threat Game theory Problem solving Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
8	4.1 Subgame Perfectness In this chapter we will make heavy use of the extensive form to study games with moves that occur in sequence. We start in section 4.1 with a refinement of the Nash equilibrium Add to Reading List Source URL: www.rasmusen.org Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35 Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Non-credible threat Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Information set Strategy Best response Outcome Game theory Problem solving Solution concept
9	Decisions, Agents and Games Marina De Vos* and Dirk Vermeir Dept. of Computer Science Free University of Brussels, VUB Pleinlaan 2, Brussels 1050, Belgium Tel: +[removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: www.tark.org Language: English - Date: 2011-10-23 10:31:50 Science Nash equilibrium Solution concept Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Non-credible threat Extensive-form game Strategy Stable model semantics Game theory Problem solving Economics
10	PDF Document Add to Reading List Source URL: homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz Language: English - Date: 2011-07-28 19:24:37 Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Subgame Nash equilibrium Non-credible threat Extensive-form game Backward induction Strategic dominance Normal-form game Game theory Problem solving Solution concept