Bidding in Almost Common Value Auctions: An Experiment Susan L. Rose Department of Economics Ohio State University John H. Kagel

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Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29 Game theory Economics Common value auction Auction First-price sealed-bid auction Vickrey auction English auction Bid Bid shading Auction theory Auctioneering Business		Bidding in Almost Common Value Auctions: An Experiment Susan L. Rose Department of Economics Ohio State University John H. Kagel Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 151,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

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