Optimal mechanism

Results: 68



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6 Prior-free Mechanisms In Chapter 3 we derived optimal mechanisms for social surplus and profit. For social surplus, the surplus maximization mechanism (Definition 3.3, page 58) is optimal pointwise on all valuation pro

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Source URL: jasonhartline.com

- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
    2

    3 Optimal Mechanisms In this chapter we discuss the objectives of social surplus and profit. As we will see, the economics of designing mechanisms to maximize social surplus is relatively simple. The optimal mechanism is

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    Source URL: jasonhartline.com

    - Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
      3Game theory / Mechanism design / Social choice theory / Expected value / Probability

      Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi

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      Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

      Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
      4Social choice theory / Political philosophy / Politics / Public choice theory / Game theory / Decision theory / Psephology / Voting system / Electronic voting / Stochastic programming / Mechanism design / Independent voter

      Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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      Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

      Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05
      5Game theory / Mechanism design / Social choice theory

      The Robustness of Robust Implementation Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehny, Stephen Morrisz January 21, 2011 Abstract We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional

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      Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:34
      6Mechanism design / Computational complexity theory / Game theory / Decision theory / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Incentive compatibility / Knapsack problem / Randomized rounding / Time complexity / Random-sampling mechanism / Bayesian-optimal mechanism

      CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
      7Social choice theory / Game theory / Political philosophy / Decision theory / Politics / Public choice theory / Psephology / Elections / Voting system / Mechanism design / Electronic voting / Incentive compatibility

      An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

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      Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-09-30 20:35:02
      8Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Market economics) / Economy / Vickrey auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Auction / Quantile / Monopoly / Valuation / Bayesian-optimal mechanism

      CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13
      9Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Marketing / Market economics) / Auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Multiunit auction / Prior-independent mechanism

      Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

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      Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

      Language: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
      10Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / Revelation principle / Auction / Prior-independent mechanism / English auction / Incentive compatibility

      A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37
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