1![5 Prior-independent Approximation In the last two chapters we discussed mechanism that performed well for a given Bayesian prior distribution. Assuming the existence of such a Bayesian prior is natural when deriving mech 5 Prior-independent Approximation In the last two chapters we discussed mechanism that performed well for a given Bayesian prior distribution. Assuming the existence of such a Bayesian prior is natural when deriving mech](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/c880498e727e19b92ca0ede570ac4388.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: jasonhartline.com- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
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2![Prior-independent Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design Nikhil Devanur1 , Jason Hartline2 ? , Anna Karlin3 , and Thach Nguyen3 1 , Microsoft Research Prior-independent Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design Nikhil Devanur1 , Jason Hartline2 ? , Anna Karlin3 , and Thach Nguyen3 1 , Microsoft Research](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/769f0d8dfd824d50820350d698c638d2.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: users.eecs.northwestern.edu- Date: 2011-09-30 18:31:24
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3![Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ae7ce1045e05e580d11b8a5b32e3c8f1.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.maths.lse.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
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4![A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6c1e6e8a6441435d40d5bd77f78c251f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37
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5![Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/eb560b6b43550ba04aa3421f3591527f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-11-02 19:36:35
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6![Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/7381b87fb54a9d96789514511d4c373d.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:35
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7![Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ed8fb4d13faaf7e539ed8a12a9e22370.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
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8![Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/8027d9a35b0c90a769b01be4f7d1b394.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:12:13
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9![CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9, CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/822911a20c2f93664f34c65d14454ed1.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12
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