1![6 Prior-free Mechanisms In Chapter 3 we derived optimal mechanisms for social surplus and profit. For social surplus, the surplus maximization mechanism (Definition 3.3, page 58) is optimal pointwise on all valuation pro 6 Prior-free Mechanisms In Chapter 3 we derived optimal mechanisms for social surplus and profit. For social surplus, the surplus maximization mechanism (Definition 3.3, page 58) is optimal pointwise on all valuation pro](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/de27a8c3f5e8b389db3305ab1d88508e.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: jasonhartline.com- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
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2![3 Optimal Mechanisms In this chapter we discuss the objectives of social surplus and profit. As we will see, the economics of designing mechanisms to maximize social surplus is relatively simple. The optimal mechanism is 3 Optimal Mechanisms In this chapter we discuss the objectives of social surplus and profit. As we will see, the economics of designing mechanisms to maximize social surplus is relatively simple. The optimal mechanism is](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/7807813b5294f3976229fc3b9954df59.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: jasonhartline.com- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
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3![Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/8439430b814b95edc723205da2d1ce7c.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.deLanguage: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
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4![Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/5b0eee4ed24294634ab805e3acebab1b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: pluto.huji.ac.ilLanguage: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05
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5![The Robustness of Robust Implementation Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehny, Stephen Morrisz January 21, 2011 Abstract We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional The Robustness of Robust Implementation Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehny, Stephen Morrisz January 21, 2011 Abstract We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/041e619b8b4950f6bee462b2b5f2c1f9.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:34
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6![CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29, CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/1d89bd9c3565885565f9c8b2fa83d8de.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
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7![An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/178786faf364faf5f42f316bca5af6d9.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ.ucla.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-09-30 20:35:02
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8![CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19, CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6e7683cb68109cc45394f8f757ae188f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13
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9![Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ae7ce1045e05e580d11b8a5b32e3c8f1.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.maths.lse.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
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10![A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6c1e6e8a6441435d40d5bd77f78c251f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37
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