Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy

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Date: 2012-04-26 10:12:13 Mechanism design Auction theory Auctions Game theory Market research Auction Prior-independent mechanism Digital goods auction Prior-free mechanism Random-sampling mechanism		Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 202,34 KB Share Document on Facebook

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