Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U

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Date: 2015-11-02 19:36:35 Mechanism design Game theory Auctions Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Prior-independent mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Multiunit auction Normal distribution		Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 208,69 KB Share Document on Facebook

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