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Social choice theory / Knowledge / Science / Artificial intelligence / Incentive compatibility / Mechanism / Price mechanism / Revelation principle / Game theory / Economics / Mechanism design


A Necessary Condition for Robust Implementation: Theory and Applications∗ Takuro Yamashita† September 26, 2011 Abstract
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Document Date: 2012-09-26 08:00:11

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Wilson / Bilateral Trading / /

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Facility

Duke University / Stanford Institute / California Institute of Technology / National University / University of California Davis / Boston University / University of Rochester / Hitotsubashi University / Stanford University / /

Organization

Duke University / California Institute of Technology / National University / University of Rochester / Boston University / University of California Davis / Hitotsubashi University / Toulouse School of Economics / Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research / Stanford University / Ecole Polytechnique / /

Person

Jonathan D. Levin / Andrea Prat / Koichi Tadenuma / Paul Milgrom / Takuro Yamashita / Gabriel D. Carroll / Silvio Micali / Matthew O. Jackson / Stephen Morris / Eve Ramaekers / Andy Skrzypacz / Alessandro Pavan / Ilya Segal / Dirk Bergemann / /

Position

mechanism designer / designer / /

SportsLeague

Stanford University / /

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