Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria∗ Roger Myerson† and Jörgen Weibull‡ September 3, 2012. This version: November 28, 2014. Abstract. When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usuall - Proper equilibrium - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria∗ Roger Myerson† and Jörgen Weibull‡ September 3, 2012. This version: November 28, 2014. Abstract. When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usuall Add to Reading List Document Date: 2014-12-03 12:14:37 Open Document File Size: 427,58 KB Share Result on Facebook City Jerusalem / Bernheim / / Facility KTH Royal Institute of Technology / Tinbergen Institute / Imperial College / University of Chicago / Yale University / / IndustryTerm present solutions / / Organization Stockholm School of Economics / Institute for Advanced Studies / Institute of Technology in Stockholm / Department of Mathematics / the University of Chicago / Department of Economics / Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam / Imperial College London / Institute of Technology / Stockholm / University of Chicago / Yale University / Ecole Polytechnique / / Person John Nash / Jean-Francois Mertens / Jun Chen / Kalai / Roger Myerson / Troels Sørensen / Erik Mohlin / Larry Samuelson / Olivier Tercieux / / Position Rt / player / / PublishedMedium Games and Economic Behavior / / SocialTag Nash equilibrium Proper equilibrium Strategy Sequential equilibrium Best response Rationalizability Solution concept Coordination game Outcome Game theory

Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria∗ Roger Myerson† and Jörgen Weibull‡ September 3, 2012. This version: November 28, 2014. Abstract. When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usuallAdd to Reading List