A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents Author(s): Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 120, No. 6 (December 2012), pp[removed]Published by: The U

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Date: 2013-03-16 06:32:05 Classical logic Propositional calculus Mathematical logic Logic Boolean algebra		A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents Author(s): Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 120, No. 6 (December 2012), pp[removed]Published by: The U Add to Reading List Source URL: arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 599,46 KB Share Document on Facebook