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Classical logic / Propositional calculus / Mathematical logic / Logic / Boolean algebra


A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents Author(s): Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 120, No. 6 (December 2012), pp[removed]Published by: The U
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Document Date: 2013-03-16 06:32:05


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Company

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Facility

Boundedly Rational Agents Jacob Glazer Tel Aviv University / University of Chicago Press / University of Chicago / Boston University Ariel Rubinstein Tel Aviv University / /

IndustryTerm

large network / information technology / search committee / /

Organization

New York University / University of Chicago Press / The University of Chicago / Tel Aviv University / European Research Council / Boston University / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / /

Person

Rani Spiegler / Sambuddha Ghosh / Jaber Zarezadeh / Bob / Carol / Michael Richter / Ariel Rubinstein / Chuck Wilson / Aviv barÞ Rubinstein / Bart Lipman / Ayala Arad / Jacob Glazer / /

Position

Author / Choice Procedure The speaker / set S. The speaker / designer / L. The speaker / speaker / undeserving speaker / bar hostess / fully rational speaker / hostess / /

PublishedMedium

Journal of Political Economy / /

Technology

information technology / /

URL

http /

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