Mookherjee EC 721 Ec721 PROBLEM SET 3 1. Suppose the policy space is a one dimensional real variable p, there are a finite (odd) number of voters each with single peaked preferences, with a median ideal point p∗M . Tw

Source URL: people.bu.edu

A characterization of single-peaked single-crossing domain Edith Elkind University of Oxford based on joint work with

Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

• Voting system criteria
• Voting
• Social choice theory
• Political philosophy
• Single peaked preferences
• Condorcet criterion
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Later-no-harm criterion

Mookherjee EC 721 Ec721 PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS 1. Suppose the policy space is a one dimensional real variable p, there are a finite (odd) number of voters each with single peaked preferences, with a median ideal point

Source URL: people.bu.edu

• Game theory
• Voting system criteria
• Decision theory
• Nash equilibrium
• Condorcet criterion
• Economic equilibrium
• Voting
• Thermodynamic equilibrium
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives

Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections Sourav Bhattacharya Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh Email: November 15, 2007

Source URL: www.wallis.rochester.edu

• Elections
• Voting system criteria
• Voting systems
• Voting theory
• Monotonicity criterion
• Voting system
• Preference
• FO
• Single peaked preferences
• Social choice theory
• Voting
• Politics

Analysis and Optimization of Multi-dimensional Percentile Mechanisms Xin Sui and Craig Boutilier and Tuomas Sandholm Abstract We consider the mechanism design problem for agents with single-peaked preferences over multi-

Source URL: www.cs.toronto.edu

• Operations research
• Mechanism design
• Price of anarchy
• Facility location
• Problem solving
• Game theory
• Social choice theory
• Percentile