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Game theory / Non-cooperative games / Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Strategy / Best response / Extensive-form game / Zero-sum game / Matching pennies / Coordination game / Battle of the sexes
Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48
Game theory
Non-cooperative games
Nash equilibrium
Subgame
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Strategy
Best response
Extensive-form game
Zero-sum game
Matching pennies
Coordination game
Battle of the sexes

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

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