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 Date: 2014-05-21 22:43:24Microeconomics Auction theory Social choice theory Fundamental theorems of welfare economics Business General equilibrium theory Mechanism design Preference Revealed preference Game theory Consumer theory Economics |
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Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule∗ Shuhei Morimoto† and Shigehiro Serizawa‡ May 13, 2014
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
