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Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule∗ Shuhei Morimoto† and Shigehiro Serizawa‡ May 13, 2014
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Document Date: 2014-05-21 22:43:24

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