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Date: 2013-05-16 06:33:01Game theory Risk dominance Bayesian game Nash equilibrium Coordination game Strategy Best response Solution concept Matching pennies Outcome Expected utility hypothesis Risk aversion | Review of Economic Studies, 181–221 c 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited $02.00Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 764,73 KBShare Document on Facebook |
Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized Matching Pennies Games Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey* April 2002 Abstract. In experimental studies of behavior in 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equiDocID: 1tjPj - View Document | |
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