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32![Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email: Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/8306384e1fb5eaf1e37d5e7a5ab0c989.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2004-08-30 10:00:02
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33![SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction. SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/0ec51ad018389f9bbe15e397fc4338b7.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: people.hss.caltech.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44
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34![Prepared with SEVIS LI D S E Microeconomics II - Winter 2006 Chapter 2 Games in Extensive Form - Subgame-perfect Prepared with SEVIS LI D S E Microeconomics II - Winter 2006 Chapter 2 Games in Extensive Form - Subgame-perfect](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/3b791db7dde4b270230c1bc19ab5de82.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.homepages.ucl.ac.ukLanguage: English - Date: 2015-05-12 11:18:25
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35![Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/daac17116c2c9567d1ff55e03cf548cd.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.tomwilkening.comLanguage: English - Date: 2016-06-05 05:04:43
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36![Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition Neil Burch, Michael Johanson and Michael Bowling Computing Science Department, University of Alberta {nburch,johanson,mbowling}@ualberta.ca Abstract Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition Neil Burch, Michael Johanson and Michael Bowling Computing Science Department, University of Alberta {nburch,johanson,mbowling}@ualberta.ca Abstract](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/190161cf1c0576a9da7c9022ae79ad07.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: poker.cs.ualberta.caLanguage: English - Date: 2014-06-09 17:40:22
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37![The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening∗ August 4, 2015 The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening∗ August 4, 2015](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/5512d953d4152a86499415f8b0a358a9.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.tomwilkening.comLanguage: English - Date: 2016-06-05 05:04:43
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38![Centralizing information in networks Centralizing information in networks](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/056f8bef3c4c26df98563e98cd64ed7a.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.jeanne-hagenbach.frLanguage: English - Date: 2010-09-21 19:30:53
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39![Subgame Perfect Implementation under Approximate Common Knowledge: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment∗ Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening July 1, 2012 Subgame Perfect Implementation under Approximate Common Knowledge: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment∗ Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening July 1, 2012](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/452c1898cc924ede7992e0516aec9872.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: research.economics.unsw.edu.au- Date: 2014-01-21 15:04:55
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40![SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/001c33d4f4bd28fac8a833351fcdc6d6.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: research.economics.unsw.edu.auLanguage: English - Date: 2014-01-20 21:58:47
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