The Intuitive Criterion

Results: 31



#Item
1Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information  Camille Cornand Frank Heinemann

Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information Camille Cornand Frank Heinemann

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:23:17
2Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele†  March 15, 2013

Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele† March 15, 2013

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Source URL: econ.ucsb.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-04-03 19:31:22
3MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

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Source URL: www.econ.nyu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21
4Microsoft Word - frontmatter.doc

Microsoft Word - frontmatter.doc

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Source URL: www.princeton.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-21 11:17:41
5The Impact of Meaningful Context on Strategic Play in Signaling Games1  David J. Cooper Department of Economics Case Western Reserve University

The Impact of Meaningful Context on Strategic Play in Signaling Games1 David J. Cooper Department of Economics Case Western Reserve University

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Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29
6Microsoft Word - DreherMikoschVoigt_IOAndFDI_102010.docx

Microsoft Word - DreherMikoschVoigt_IOAndFDI_102010.docx

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Source URL: ncgg.princeton.edu

Language: English - Date: 2010-11-10 06:40:08
7Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Teams: Forward Induction or Faster Adaptive Learning?* David J. Cooper Department of Economics Florida State University

Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Teams: Forward Induction or Faster Adaptive Learning?* David J. Cooper Department of Economics Florida State University

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Source URL: web.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-03 09:58:11
8Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele†  March 15, 2013

Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele† March 15, 2013

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Source URL: www.econ.ucsb.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-04-03 19:31:22
9False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University  Dr. Theodore To

False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University Dr. Theodore To

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Source URL: kelley.iu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-01-16 10:56:16
10C:�iles�nalling�ms.I�msd.finalAER.wpd

C:ilesnallingms.Imsd.finalAER.wpd

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Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29