FAQ-learning in Matrix Games: Demonstrating Convergence near Nash Equilibria, and Bifurcation of Attractors in the Battle of Sexes Michael Kaisers, Karl Tuyls Maastricht University P.O. BoxMD Maastricht, The Ne

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Date: 2012-04-29 08:04:49 Structure Nash equilibrium Replicator equation Dynamical system Evolutionary game theory Agent-based model Strategy Coordination game Evolutionarily stable strategy Game theory Science Problem solving		FAQ-learning in Matrix Games: Demonstrating Convergence near Nash Equilibria, and Bifurcation of Attractors in the Battle of Sexes Michael Kaisers, Karl Tuyls Maastricht University P.O. BoxMD Maastricht, The Ne Add to Reading List Source URL: michaelkaisers.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 143,55 KB Share Document on Facebook

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