Almost Common Values Auctions Revisited* Dan Levin and John H. Kagel Department of Economics The Ohio State University 1945 North High Street Columbus, Ohio

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Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29 Game theory Economics Vickrey auction Common value auction Auction First-price sealed-bid auction English auction Bid Bid shading Auction theory Auctioneering Business		Almost Common Values Auctions Revisited* Dan Levin and John H. Kagel Department of Economics The Ohio State University 1945 North High Street Columbus, Ohio Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 209,17 KB Share Document on Facebook

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