OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

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Date: 2008-11-06 16:24:21 Game theory Nash equilibrium Best response Strategy Global game Risk dominance Solution concept Coordination game Outcome Bayesian game Folk theorem		OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN Add to Reading List Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 219,87 KB Share Document on Facebook

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