Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

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Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48 Game theory Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Strategy Best response Extensive-form game Zero-sum game Matching pennies Coordination game Battle of the sexes		Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an Add to Reading List Source URL: userwww.sfsu.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 220,65 KB Share Document on Facebook

	SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert DocID: 1sUMm - View Document
	Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an DocID: 1roEf - View Document
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	The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf DocID: 1qJxb - View Document