Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion David J. Cooper Florida State University and University of East Anglia Kai-Uwe Kühn

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Date: 2013-07-15 09:37:00 Human behavior Nash equilibrium Risk dominance Coordination game Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Repeated game Outcome Cheating in chess Ultimatum game Game theory Gaming Problem solving		Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion David J. Cooper Florida State University and University of East Anglia Kai-Uwe Kühn Add to Reading List Source URL: ec.europa.eu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 206,70 KB Share Document on Facebook

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