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Game theory / Mechanism design / Marketing / Auctions / Decision theory / Auction theory / Optimal mechanism / Profit / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Bitcoin / Online advertising
Date: 2014-05-23 12:27:48
Game theory
Mechanism design
Marketing
Auctions
Decision theory
Auction theory
Optimal mechanism
Profit
VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
VickreyClarkeGroves auction
Bitcoin
Online advertising

Speaker: Susan Athey (Stanford) Title: The economics of crypto-currencies Abstract: This presentation takes an early look at the economics of Bitcoin and alternative cryptocurrencies, with a focus on raising open questio

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