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Date: 2010-06-08 08:08:24Game theory Non-cooperative games The Evolution of Cooperation Repeated game Risk dominance Strategic dominance Co-operation Tit for tat Cooperation Coordination game Best response Centipede game | Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.docAdd to Reading ListSource URL: cess.nyu.eduDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 284,08 KBShare Document on Facebook |
Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.docDocID: 1rcql - View Document | |
Nonequilibrium Solution Concepts: Iterated Dominance and Rationalizability Page 1 Nonequilibrium Solution Concepts: Iterated Dominance and RationalizabilityDocID: 1r8v1 - View Document | |
CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #15: Best-Case and Strong Nash Equilibria∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 11,DocID: 1r5OV - View Document | |
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A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of One-shot Games Colin F. Camerer1 California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CATeck-Hua HoDocID: 1qnGO - View Document |