Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

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Date: 2015-09-17 09:28:36 Game theory Decision theory Gaming Leisure Nash equilibrium Cheap talk Subgame perfect equilibrium Strategy Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Best response Coordination game		Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida** Add to Reading List Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 183,83 KB Share Document on Facebook

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